Digital platforms: exerting China’s new cultural power in the Asia-Pacific by Keane, Michael & Fung, A.
Media Industries 5.1 (2018)
Digital Platforms: Exerting China’s  
New Cultural Power in the Asia-Pacific
Michael Keane and Anthony Y. H. Fung1
CURTIN UNIVERSITY AND THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
m.keane [AT] curtin.edu.au and anthonyfung [AT] cuhk.edu.hk
Abstract:
The ascension to power of Xi Jinping in 2012 marks a significant moment in 
regard to Chinese perceptions of the nation’s role in history and the role China 
might play in world affairs during the coming decade. The term “cultural 
confidence” (wenhua zixin) increasingly animates discussion about how Chinese 
media industries are extending their reach beyond the mainland. In this 
special section, the authors investigate the ramifications of a more culturally 
confident Chinese nation, emboldened by the technological ascendency of its 
digital champions, represented by Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent—often referred to 
collectively as BAT. These privately owned internet communication companies 
are reaching out to foreign audiences while reconnecting culturally with the 
Chinese diaspora. The question that comes to the forefront of China’s newfound 
“cultural power” is, “How far and with what effect are China’s online media 
companies internationalizing?” The special section looks at the Asia-Pacific, 
noting how these digital media companies are diversifying and consolidating in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong SAR, as well as in Southeast Asia—Singapore, Malaysia, 
South Korea, and Thailand. 
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In December 2001, following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
financial sustainability and cultural sovereignty of the nation’s media industries loomed as a 
challenge to the nation’s leadership. Media industries—formerly designated as state-owned 
institutions (shiye)—were intended to function as state propaganda vehicles, much as they 
had been during the 1940s. From the heady days of the Chinese Revolution under Chairman 
Mao and the War of Resistance against Japanese forces to the economic reform period of the 
1980s, media were the “mouthpiece” of the government and the Chinese Communist Party 
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(CCP), and in theory, at least, they were the mouthpiece “of the masses” in so far as the media 
were supposed to represent the masses.
The early 1980s witnessed green shoots of commercialization in broadcasting and the devo-
lution of financial control from the center to four administrative different levels, a policy 
known as the “four-level policy” (sijiban). Despite this initiative, and a move by Deng Xiaoping 
in 1992 to reduce state funding to media industries in the guise of evoking self-reliance, by 
the turn of the century commercially successful media were mostly confined to a small num-
ber of satellite television stations that competed for national market share. With few excep-
tions, print media were unprofitable and the film industry was maneuvering for reform, 
following a decade of declining returns, and oppressive state censorship.
The questions facing the government at the turn of the millennium were, “How could China’s 
newly commercialized media survive in the face of foreign competition?” “How could they be 
made stronger, and how could they go out to the world?” As WTO accession approached, 
many professionals working in the media and communications sector feared that foreign 
media companies would gain greater purchase in the market, further diminishing the attrac-
tiveness of homemade content with its inherent Chinese values.
This fear proved to be largely unfounded. What happened?
In the 2000s, Web 2.0 changed the way that people make, share, and consume content. The 
distinction between professional media producers and consumers of media collapsed, user-
generated content proliferated, along with online sharing, and, thanks to digital compres-
sion technologies, cultural products went online. Western media empires were soon 
challenged by upstart digital companies with their assets of data and their legions of active 
users. In China, the emergence of powerful commercial media companies, and particularly 
online platforms, was fast-forwarded by the rapid numbers of people venturing online. By 
2010, the number of registered users of internet services was 460 million; by 2016, it was 
already 721 million2; more importantly, China had leapfrogged PC terminals into the mobile 
internet. The power of these companies, particularly their links to Western financial com-
panies,3 and their ability to react to market opportunities provide a stark contrast to a 
state-owned media sector presided over by conservative apparatchiks.
In this special section, the authors address issues confronting the development of China’s digi-
tal communications industries through the lens of “cultural power,” a term first coined in 1988 
by CCP think tanks4 and recently revised by the Xi Jinping regime. The section investigates the 
unprecedented rise and geographical expansion of China’s new media platforms, which are 
sometimes referred to as digital champions, echoing the laudatory expression of national 
champions, normally associated with large state-owned enterprises. The new players are not 
state-owned, at least not in the way that media industries were in the previous decades. They 
have initial public offerings (IPOs), they engage in aggressively capitalist-style mergers and 
takeovers, and they push the boundaries of expression. The leading entities, often character-
ized as BAT—Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent—or the “Three Kingdoms” have data business models 
similar to the Western-headquartered FAANG: Facebook, Apple, Amazon Netflix, and Google.
In addition to charting the rise of online media sectors, this special section addresses the 
relative successes (and failures) of “going out” (zou chuqu), a policy slogan that symbolizes 
China’s rise, namely its soft power initiatives outside the mainland. In an industrial sense, 
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going out is synonymous with going global, a path created by large state-owned enterprises, 
later followed by commercial businesses such as Lenovo (computing), Haier (white goods) 
and Huawei (mobile phones). The question that many are now asking is, “How far and with 
what effect are China’s online media companies internationalizing?” In showing how the 
interests of China’s media have developed through various collaborations, the papers inves-
tigate reputational and economic gains across three interconnected levels (or layers): state 
institutions, digital platforms, and user communities.
State institutions make the rules and set the targets for Five-Year Plans: they include state 
regulatory agencies, ministries, departments, and think tanks such as the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). 
This layer also includes state-owned media institutions, such as China Central Television 
(CCTV) and China Global TV (CGTV), which purport to reach out to all Chinese, even those 
overseas. Digital platforms are represented primarily by the BAT; as noted above, these digi-
tal kingdoms are busy cannibalizing social networking firms, game developers, online video 
portals, logistics, and apps to strengthen their market position and compete with each other 
for the spoils of war. The user layer, on the contrary, thrives on a culture of contention.5 
While many are patriotic, many others are hostile; indeed, many rely on messages going out 
to the world to underpin civil society activism. The tension between government, business, 
and users characterizes the complex nature of China’s nascent platform capitalism.6
Charting the global trajectories of China’s internet companies and associated online ventures 
is an ambitious task, particularly in the light of recent capital withdrawals from Western acqui-
sitions as the Chinese state turns up the heat on ambitious cultural enterprises, in particular 
the entertainment/real estate conglomerate known as Dalian Wanda (see the paper by Keane 
and Wu). The intention of this special issue, moreover, is to examine the People’s Republic of 
China’s (PRC) media industry activities in the Asia-Pacific, including several of the Eurasian 
territories now embodied in the term Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The territories investigated 
include, but are not confined to, Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia.
The paper by Michael Keane and Huan Wu charts the “going out” network strategies of 
China’s leading digital communication platforms, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent. The paper 
shows that with regard to audiences and users of their platforms, the most likely takeoff 
points outside the mainland are within Asia. Accordingly, the focus is on media content plat-
forms and the opportunities that are emerging within the Asia-Pacific, the latter territory 
including Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Australia. The paper notes three levels of 
going out: cultural products and services, ideology, and organizations. As these platforms 
push their commercial content to audiences in these territories, they are accompanied by 
official standard bearers of China’s soft power such as China Network TV and Xinhua, whose 
message resonates more closely with Party ideology. In this paper, the authors ask, “Whose 
interests are the digital communications platforms really serving?”
Susan Leong’s paper examines the role China’s tech giants’ CEOs play as advocates for China’s 
dream of mass innovation (wanzhong chuangxin). Leong argues that their reconciliation of 
the Silicon Valley ethos of liberal individualism is at odds with the Chinese state’s agenda of 
collectivism. Leong explains how the gospel of mass innovation is triumphing despite the 
trials of control via surveillance and censorship. The paper includes a survey of investments 
and collaborations in internet and tech-related enterprises made by China’s tech giants in 
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Southeast Asia. It then goes on to discuss the growing influence of these heroic figures, 
noting Jack Ma’s (Alibaba CEO) growing influence as advisor to the governments of Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Thailand as a case in point.
Haiqing Yu’s paper looks at the rise of eSports as a key battlefield among Chinese Internet 
and e-commerce heavyweights—particularly Alibaba and Tencent—in their aggregated and 
global expansion strategies. Yu investigates how politics, capitalism, and nationalism are 
intertwined in the investing and staging of live eSports spectacles. The discussion builds on 
Chinese digital platforms’ Asia-Pacific expansion and is particularly significant due to the 
announcement by the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) that eSports will be introduced as a 
demonstration sport at the 2018 Asian Games in Indonesia and as an official sport at the 
Hangzhou Games in 2022. The paper shows how the rise of eSports in China is a story of 
digital enclosure movement of Chinese digital empires and heavyweights—that it is a story 
of the public–private alliance in promoting, regulating, and incorporating private resources 
and players into the orbit of the Chinese dream.
Elaine Jing Zhao’s paper considers online streaming platforms as a typical case of the digital 
entertainment industry, which has experienced rapid growth and consolidation under 
China’s two-pronged approach to the internet. Zhao notes two forms of “going out” of digital 
entertainment media. One is often less visible, where overseas viewers, mostly diasporic 
Chinese, attempt to access a growing range of content on these digital platforms. Such 
cross-border access often involves geoblocking circumvention. The other is platform-initiated 
expansion. The paper focuses on the Baidu-owned online streaming platform iQiyi’s entry 
into the Taiwanese market to highlight the regulatory dilemma over market entry, the com-
plexities of negotiating windows in multimarket, and multimedia distribution involving var-
ied business models and modes of access. The paper shows how platforms and their partners, 
as well as viewers, negotiate state and copyright territorialities as they cross borders.
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